Review of:, Zini, Tony, General; & Tony Koltz. The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and Purpose. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.

            On the same level as Colin Powell, there is probably no other American military officer in the 21^st Century more qualified to comment on the politics of war and peace than General of the Marine Corps Tony Zinni, U.S.M.C. (Ret.). Reaching four-star rank and holding the most important overseas command as commander-in-chief (C-in-C, pronounced “sink”) of U.S. Central Command, Zinni served on the front line of the war on terror before America knew it was at war. U.S. Central Command, expanded during Zinni’s tour, includes Eastern Africa, Southwest Asia, the Middle East (though excluding the Levant), and Central Asia.

             Overseeing the Iraqi no-fly zones and directing the 1998 Desert Fox bombing of Iraq, Zinni was in charge of all military planning and operations as C-in-C/CentCom from 1997-2000. He was first introduced to the wider public in one installment of Tom Clancy’s “Commander Series,” Battle Ready, Tony Zinni’s semi-autobiography, also co-written by Tony Koltz. As a Marine infantry officer, Zinni served as both an advisor and Marine company commander in Vietnam. He rose from post to post, slated for one of the top jobs as commanding officer of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. With his appointment by President Clinton to Central Command, Zinni had earned all the credentials possible as a capable and inspiring leader in the elite Marine tradition.

            Having also been President Bush’s envoy to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process after retirement, Zinni will best be remember for his astuteness for diplomacy and understanding of the politics of war AND peace. As C-in-C of CentCom, Zinni built on his experience with peace-keeping and humanitarian interventions in Kurdistan, East Africa, and East Asia to build a philosophy of conflict resolution and prevention. In those missions as a top military representative to those “joint” military-civil actions, Zinni implemented processes, from which he drew rules, whereby international efforts of different countries’ governments, militaries, civil agencies, private charities and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could cooperate to do a mission of mercy.

            It is not only as a benevolent, humane act to intervene in civil war, famine, genocide, or inter-state conflict around which Zinni formed his philosophy. As someone who has seen conflict both in the trenches and from the cabinet-level view, Zinni believes that failure to prevent natural or manmade disaster, or failure to terminate local conflict in its infancy, will only cause the sneeze to turn into a cold, or worse. In other words, when the nations of the world ignore problems, when problems can still be easily solved, the problem grows into a monster of poverty, extermination, dictatorship, violence, failed states, regional war and, of course, terrorism.

            As Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, Zinni was what modern historians refer to as a “proconsul,” a governmental representative with undivided authority given by his or her head of government over an area of responsibility (AOR) in all matters affecting policy. Zinni negotiated personally with heads of government, military chiefs, ministers, and diplomats serving the vital United States national interest of security and cooperation in the Indian Ocean Basin. As a “warrior-diplomat,” Zinni was skilled in synergizing all elements of power–military, political, economic, cultural, and social–into a coherent international “coalition of interest” to prevent war or other conflict from becoming international upheaval. Near the end of his term at Central Command, Zinni directed the first-ever American security-relief-reform-and-reconstruction planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. The planning included scenarios in which Saddam Hussein either died in or was removed from power, from within or without. Zinni’s successor as C-in-C/CentCom General Tommy Franks, discontinued the planning. (Note: The title of “C-in-C” for all unified commands was changed to “Combatant Commander” by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld). In 2003, after the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces, there was no plan to win the peace.

            Battle for Peace is an accumulation of Zinni’s experiences, formatted into a coherent policy for the future. He sees the need for a multi-dimensional policy and a full-spectrum response of America and other nations to act, and to act before the sneeze becomes a cold, or even worse pneumonia. The solution, according to Zinni, is coordination in the U.S. Government by a dedicated organization and personnel system, involving every agency and with a “reserve” system of part-time civilians. He believes the result of this could be two-fold: an orderly system of decision-making and a focus on priorities in a multi-national response. Zinni sees the current dysfunction of the “wars after the wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan as a disconnect between proper planning and efficient execution. The problem with Zinni’s recommendations, however, is that he gives no clear direction on how to avoid the same bureaucratic glacier that America currently has when something urgent needs to be done.

            Zinni’s views are the basis for a newer, smarter approach to dealing with the inevitable problems that happen when America ignores important problems. America can no longer pursue the wrong objectives, at the wrong place, and at the wrong time. Zinni’s approaches to conflict resolution and true international stability need to be considered. At the very least, it will not hurt to look at it. America’s recent history clearly indicates that we need some idea–some way–newer and smarter, to protect our national interests.